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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 8, 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
despite the extreme verbal and sexual harassment Harold Wasek 
encountered while working on an oil rig in 2008, he could not 
bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim against his employer, 
because he could not prove his aggressor was homosexual.2 
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, 
Inc. in many ways represents the growing confusion surrounding 
same-sex sexual harassment claims since the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue in the 1998 case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.3 In Oncale, the Court held that nothing in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars a claim of same-sex sexual 
harassment, so long as the discrimination occurred because of the 
victim’s sex.4 This “because of sex” requirement means that the 
victim must be “exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”5 
In Oncale, the Court laid out three evidentiary routes for proving 
that same-sex sexual harassment had occurred.6 Subsequently, the 
Sixth Circuit in Wasek interpreted these evidentiary routes as 
exhaustive.7 This meant that the harassment alleged by Wasek had 
to fall into one of the three categories, or it would not be 
actionable under Title VII.8 
Wasek solidified a growing circuit split between the courts on 
how to interpret the evidentiary routes laid out in Oncale.9 In many 
ways, courts oversimplify same-sex sexual harassment claims by 
over-emphasizing certain theories of sexual harassment and under-
emphasizing other theories of harassment. This over-simplification 
is especially evident when courts treat the evidentiary routes from 
Oncale as exhaustive, rather than merely illustrative.10 
 
 2.  Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 3.  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 4.  Id. at 79.  
 5.  Id. at 80.  
 6.  Id. at 80–81.  
 7.  See Wasek, 682 F.3d at 467–68. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  See infra Part IV.  
 10.  See infra Part IV. 
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This comment first examines the requirements for bringing a 
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 The 
comment then looks to the history of Title VII for guidance on 
interpretation of the statute.12 The development of sexual 
harassment as part of Title VII sex discrimination is then examined, 
as well as the development of same-sex sexual harassment before 
and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale.13 Next, the 
comment presents the growing circuit split among the courts.14 
This comment argues that interpreting the evidentiary routes 
from Oncale as exhaustive oversimplifies the complicated dilemma 
of same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace. The comment 
looks to the Oncale decision itself for guidance on how to interpret 
both the evidentiary routes and the “because of sex” requirement 
for Title VII discrimination cases.15 The comment additionally 
argues that interpreting the examples as a rigid formula places too 
much emphasis on sexual desire and not enough emphasis on 
other motivations behind same-sex sexual harassment.16 
Furthermore, the emphasis on sexual desire leads courts to 
improperly use sexual orientation to determine whether conduct 
occurred “because of sex.”17 This comment provides some examples 
of situations that may not be covered under the three evidentiary 
routes but clearly constitute sexual harassment under Title VII.18 
Finally, the author advocates for system-wide changes that reflect 
the complexities of sexual harassment.19 These changes will allow 
plaintiffs to bring same-sex sexual harassment claims despite the 
fact that their harassment cases may fall outside of the traditional 
categories of sexual harassment. 
II. BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII 
According to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is 
illegal for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with 
 
 11.  See infra Part II. 
 12.  See infra Part III. 
 13.  See infra Part III.  
 14.  See infra Part IV.  
 15.  See infra Part V.A–B. 
 16.  See infra Part V.C. 
 17.  See infra Part V.D. 
 18.  See infra Part V.E. 
 19.  See infra Part V.F.  
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”20 An employer can be held liable for sexual 
harassment under Title VII when submission to sexual harassment 
is required as a term of employment, when submission to or 
rejection of an instance of sexual harassment is used to make 
employment decisions, or when the sexual harassment has created 
an abusive or hostile work environment.21 
Although not expressly mentioned in Title VII, sexual 
discrimination can include claims of sexual harassment, such as 
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.”22 What 
differentiates sexual harassment from other forms of discrimi-
nation, which tend to be rooted in prejudice or hatred, is that 
sexual harassment may also be motivated by sexual desire or 
attraction.23 
Critical to the sexual harassment analysis is the requirement 
that the discrimination occurred because of sex. This means the 
individual on the receiving end of the harassment must prove that 
he or she faced “‘disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex [were] not 
exposed.’”24 
Furthermore, an employee may bring a sexual harassment 
claim based on sexual discrimination that has created a hostile or 
abusive working environment.25 To bring a hostile work 
environment claim, one must prove not only that the harassment 
occurred because of sex, but also that the harassment was 
 
 20.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 21.  EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(a) (2013). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between Love and Hate: Same Sex 
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (citing 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998)) (“Illegal sexual 
harassment may occur . . . regardless of whether the harasser is motivated by desire 
or hatred.”). 
 24.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 25.  Jeanne-Marie Bates, Feminist Methodology: Influencing Hostile Environment 
Sexual Harassment Claims, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 143, 145–46 (1994). 
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unwelcome, adequately pervasive or severe, and that there exists 
some basis for imputing liability to an employer.26 
III. HISTORY OF TITLE VII 
A. Inclusion of Sex Discrimination 
Enacted in 1964, Title VII was originally designed to eliminate 
employment barriers for minorities.27 The legislative intent behind 
adding an amendment for discrimination based on sex is unclear.28 
Opposition to the Civil Rights Act primarily came from two 
different groups: conservatives who believed federal intervention 
into the private sphere was inappropriate, and Southern supporters 
of the “region’s segregated racial patterns.”29 
Proponents of the bill were thus skeptical when Democratic 
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, a longtime critic of the 
civil rights movement, proposed amending the Act to include 
discrimination on the basis of sex.30 Certain proponents of the Civil 
Rights Act, such as chief sponsor of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
Edith Green, believed that discrimination against black Americans 
was more severe than discrimination against women.31 
Furthermore, they believed that Smith’s actual motive behind 
introducing the sex discrimination amendment was to defeat the 
bill.32 For example, scholars note how the debate surrounding the 
amendment initially included little more than sarcastic remarks.33 
At that time, the desire to protect women from harsh work 
 
 26.  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Katz v. Dole, 
709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903–04 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
 27.  See 3 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 6:1 (2012).  
 28.  See AUGUST B. COCHRAN III, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE LAW: THE 
MECHELLE VINSON CASE 19–21 (2004).  
 29.  Id. at 19. 
 30.  Id. at 19–20. 
 31.  HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 136 (1990).  
 32.  See id.; see also COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 20.  
 33.  See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 31 (Howard Smith stated, “This bill is so 
imperfect . . . what harm will this little amendment do?”).  
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environments was thought to justify treating men and women 
differently in the workplace.34 
To the surprise of skeptics, however, Representative Smith had 
been a long-time supporter of women’s rights.35 Smith’s true 
intentions in introducing the amendment may be irrelevant, 
however, because many female legislators who legitimately 
supported the amendment took an active role in the debate after 
Smith’s introduction.36 With the support of those female Congress 
members and other women’s rights groups, the amendment was 
passed by the House, along with the rest of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, with the final vote totaling 290 to 130.37 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the involved motives, 
legal scholars have experienced difficulties determining the 
legislative intent of the sex discrimination aspects of Title VII, 
which, in combination with the ambiguity of the plain meaning of 
the statute,38 may explain why various courts have interpreted the 
statute differently.39 
B. Inclusion of Sexual Harassment Based on Hostile Work Environment 
Sexual harassment is not expressly mentioned in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.40 In fact, the term was not coined until 
1974 during a consciousness-raising event organized by Lin Farley 
at Cornell University.41 However, over the years, the Equal 
 
 34.  See COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 19–20.  
 35.  GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 136 (noting Smith’s support of the Equal 
Rights Amendment and his political ties to the National Women’s Party). The 
National Women’s Party was a largely white, middle-class organization, which may 
explain Smith’s support. See COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 21.  
 36.  COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 20. Martha Griffiths, a female representative 
from Michigan, pointed out the danger of not including the amendment when 
she said, “You are going to have white men in one bracket, you are going to try to 
take colored men and colored women and give them equal employment rights, 
and down at the bottom of the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at 
all.” GRAHAM, supra note 31, at 137.  
 37.  COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 21.  
 38.  See infra Part V.B.  
 39.  See 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 27, § 6:1. 
 40.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 41.  Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 8 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004).  
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) began to recognize 
sex discrimination as encompassing sexual harassment.42 This shift 
was largely influenced by a book published in 1979 by legal scholar 
Catharine MacKinnon entitled Sexual Harassment of Working 
Women.43 According to MacKinnon, sexual harassment “undercuts 
women’s potential for social equality in two interpenetrated ways: 
by using her employment position to coerce her sexually, while 
using her sexual position to coerce her economically.”44 To 
MacKinnon, sexual harassment was thus sexual discrimination 
because it was used as a tool for maintaining male power and 
privilege over women.45 
Barnes v. Train46 is considered to be the first sexual harassment 
case brought in federal court.47 The plaintiff, Ms. Barnes, claimed 
her employer engaged in sexual discrimination when she was 
reassigned and her former position was abolished after she refused 
to engage in sexual relations with her boss.48 The district court held 
that what happened to Ms. Barnes did not fall under Title VII due 
to the fact that the alleged retaliation from her employer occurred 
“not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage 
in a sexual affair with her supervisor.”49 The district court therefore 
granted summary judgment in favor of Barnes’ employers.50 
Barnes filed an appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.51 
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that 
Barnes was in fact discriminated against based on her gender and 
that “[b]ut for her womanhood . . . her participation in sexual 
activity would never have been solicited.”52 
 
 42.  See 52 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 2 (1999). 
 43.  COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 49. 
 44.  CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: 
A CASE FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION 7 (1979). 
 45.  COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 49.  
 46.  No. 1828-73, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974). 
 47.  COCHRAN, supra note 28, at 51. 
 48.  Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *1. 
 49.  Id. at *3. 
 50.  Id. at *5. 
 51.  Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 52.  Id. at 990. 
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Nearly a decade later, in 1986, the Supreme Court ruled in the 
landmark case Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson53 for the first time 
that an employee can bring a sex discrimination case under Title 
VII for sexual harassment that created a hostile work 
environment.54 The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
Congress intended Title VII to apply only to “tangible” or 
“economic” discrimination and concluded that “the phrase ‘terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional 
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women in employment.”55 
C. Inclusion of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment 
Although Congress’ initial purpose in enacting Title VII was to 
protect women,56 the Supreme Court, in Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, stated that the protection against 
discrimination provided by Title VII extends to male as well as 
female employees.57 Since Newport expanded the definition of who 
is protected under Title VII, a circuit split began to develop over 
whether Title VII also extends to same-sex sexual harassment.58 
 
 53.  477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 54.  Id. at 66. 
 55.  Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing L.A. 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)); see also 
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. 
Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[I]t is evident that this prohibition, 
along with other statutes such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963 . . . was enacted 
primarily to protect women against discrimination in the marketplace and to open 
employment opportunities for women in occupations that had traditionally been 
closed to them.”).  
 57.  462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983). 
 58.  Certain circuits held that same-sex sexual harassment was never 
actionable, some held that same-sex sexual harassment was always actionable, and 
some held that same-sex harassment was only actionable if the harasser was 
homosexual. Compare Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533, 1993 WL 529956, at *1 
(5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (holding that harassment by a male supervisor against a 
male subordinate could never amount to a claim under Title VII), with Doe ex rel 
Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 573 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding Congress’ 
language makes it clear “that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under 
Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her harasser”), and McWilliams v. 
Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195–96 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that heterosexual-on-heterosexual sexual harassment could never qualify as 
8
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The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 1998 in Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.59 The petitioner, Joseph Oncale, 
worked for respondent Sundowner Offshore Services on an oil 
platform in the Gulf of Mexico. While working on the platform, 
Oncale was subject to sex-related humiliation and physical assault 
of a sexual nature.60 Additionally, he was threatened with rape by 
his male coworkers.61 Oncale eventually quit his job due to the 
harassment and filed a Title VII complaint with the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.62 Both the 
district court and the Fifth Circuit held that no cause of action 
existed for male-on-male sexual harassment.63 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision with only one 
concurrence by Justice Thomas, held that nothing in the language 
of the statute or the Court’s precedents prohibited claims based on 
same-sex discrimination.64 However, the Court stated, “We have 
never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between 
men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex 
merely because the words used have sexual content or 
connotations.”65 Thus, the Court made clear that Title VII 
discrimination must have occurred because of the victim’s sex. 
Furthermore, the Court in Oncale held that although sexual 
desire may provide a motive for sexual harassment, sexual desire is 
not a necessary motive to support a claim of sex discrimination.66 
Justice Scalia then listed three examples in which same-sex sexual 
harassment would be actionable under Title VII. The first situation 
is the one described above, where an employee or supervisor makes 
a sexual pass at a coworker based on sexual desire.67 The second 
situation occurs when a harasser is motivated by general hostility 
toward the presence of a certain gender in the workplace.68 For 
 
discrimination under Title VII because it was not motivated by the “the victim’s 
sex”).  
 59.  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 60.  Id. at 77. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  See id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 79.  
 65.  Id. at 80. 
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id.  
9
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example, a woman may discriminate against a female coworker 
based on a belief that women do not belong in that area of work.69 
Finally, the third example occurs when an employee is treated 
differently from employees of the opposite gender in a mixed-
gender workplace.70 
The Court additionally emphasized that courts must judge 
each case based on a consideration of “all the circumstances” 
surrounding the case.71 For example, if conduct is “not severe or 
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment,” the conduct is “beyond Title VII’s purview.”72 After 
the Supreme Court decided Oncale, a number of same-sex sexual 
harassment cases arose which presented new questions for courts to 
consider.73 
 
 69.  Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co. posits an additional example of a male 
doctor who believes that men should not be employed as nurses and who 
therefore may harass a coworker who is a male nurse. 260 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 70.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81.  
 71.  Id. at 81 (“In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires 
careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and 
is experienced by its target.”); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
FACT SHEET: SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc 
.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/fs-sex.pdf (stating that allegations must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis).  
 72.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.  
 73.  In addition, Oncale opened the door to some high-profile settlements. 
Larry Keller, Same-Sex Harassment Not Always About Sex, HUMAN RESOURCE 
EXECUTIVE ONLINE (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story 
.jhtml?id= 534356256. For example, in August 1999, the EEOC settled a lawsuit 
against Long Prairie Packing Company, a meat packing plant in Long Prairie, 
Minnesota, for $1.9 million. In 2000, the EEOC settled a lawsuit against one of 
Colorado’s top auto dealerships, Burt Chevrolet and LGC Management, for 
$500,000. Joseph H. Mitchell, the attorney responsible for prosecuting the 
Colorado case, stated, “If such blatant discriminatory action was directed toward 
female workers, there would be no disagreement over whether it was sexual 
harassment. But because it happened to men, management was initially 
indifferent to the situation.” Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, EEOC Settles Same-Sex Harassment Suit for a Half Million Dollars 
Against Major Colorado Auto Dealership (Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www 
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom /release/8-4-00.cfm.  
10
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IV. EMERGING CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Although Oncale resolved some questions regarding same-sex 
sexual harassment, the Court’s opinion caused a further circuit 
split over whether the three examples of same-sex harassment 
provided by the Court constitute an exhaustive list.74 
A. Narrow Reading of Oncale 
At least one circuit court has held that the list provided in 
Oncale is exhaustive.75 In this interpretation, a plaintiff must allege 
that the harasser was either motivated by a homosexual sexual 
desire, was acting with a general hostility toward the victim’s sex, or 
was treating men and women differently in the workplace.76 If the 
harassment does not fit into one of these categories, then the Title 
VII claim is dismissed.77 
In Wasek v. Arrow Energy Services, Inc., Harold Wasek worked on 
an oil rig with an all-male crew.78 One of his fellow crew members, 
Paul Ottobre, started harassing Wasek by sexually touching him79 
and making sexual comments toward him.80 Wasek, frustrated that 
no one would intervene on his behalf, left the oil rig.81 Wasek then 
 
 74.  The Sixth Circuit has explicitly ruled that the three examples listed in 
Oncale are exhaustive, while other circuits have ruled that the list from Oncale is 
nonexhaustive. Additionally, some circuits have recognized the circuit split but 
have declined to rule on the matter. Compare Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 
682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Oncale list is exhaustive), with Bibby, 
260 F.3d at 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Oncale list is nonexhaustive), and 
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999) (same), and James v. 
Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x 864 (10th Cir. 2004) (same), and Barrows v. 
Seneca Foods Corp., 512 F. App’x 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to answer whether 
the evidentiary routes were exhaustive). 
 75.  See Wasek, 682 F.3d 467–68. 
 76.  Id.; see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 77.  Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468.  
 78.  Id. at 465.  
 79.  Ottobre grabbed his buttocks and poked his rear on multiple occasions 
with a hammer handle and a long sucker rod. Id. 
 80.  Ottobre told Wasek he had a “pretty mouth,” “pretty lips,” and “you know 
you like it sweetheart.” Id. Ottobre also called Wasek and left him a voicemail on 
one occasion, stating, “I miss holding you. I miss spooning with you. I love you. 
Please call me back.” Id. at 466. 
 81.  Id.  
11
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brought a Title VII sexual harassment claim against Arrow Energy.82 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Arrow 
Energy, and Wasek appealed to the Sixth Circuit.83 
The Sixth Circuit emphasized that although same-sex sexual 
harassment is just as actionable as different-sex sexual harassment, 
“Title VII is not ‘a general civility code for the American 
workplace.’”84 The court cautioned that unless there exists an 
additional element of discrimination, mere bullying is not 
actionable under Title VII.85 
The Sixth Circuit then analyzed the conduct of Ottobre under 
the three situations provided in Oncale.86 Because only men worked 
at the oil rig, the court ruled that the last two categories (general 
hostility towards men and comparative treatment between opposite 
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace) could not apply to this case.87 This 
left only the first category available to Wasek—sexual harassment 
based on sexual desire.88 The court stated that “in order to infer 
discrimination, Wasek must demonstrate that Ottobre was 
homosexual.”89 
Oncale requires “credible evidence” of a harasser’s sexual 
orientation.90 The only evidence in the record concerning 
Ottobre’s sexual orientation was a statement from Wasek in his 
deposition.91 Wasek stated in the deposition that he thought 
Ottobre was “a little strange” and “possibly bisexual.”92 The court 
ruled that a single speculative statement was insufficient to infer a 
person’s sexual orientation, and because Wasek was unable to 
prove that Ottobre was gay or bisexual, the court dismissed the 
claim.93 
 
 82.  Id. at 467. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 
(1998)).  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 467–68.  
 87.  Id. at 468. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 
(1998)).  
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
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B. Broad Readings of Oncale 
Unlike Wasek, some circuits have addressed the issue and 
decided that the list from Oncale is merely illustrative and therefore 
nonexhaustive. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Shepherd v. 
Slater Steels Corp., stated “we discern nothing in the Supreme Court’s 
decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be 
exhaustive rather than instructive.”94 The Third and Tenth Circuits 
came to similar conclusions.95 
In EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit 
addressed a case where a male construction worker was subjected 
to sexually vulgar language on a construction site by a male 
coworker.96 In this case, the plaintiff argued that he was harassed 
because he did not conform to the male stereotype.97 The plaintiff 
argued that his use of “Wet Ones” instead of toilet paper was 
perceived as not conforming to masculine gender norms, which led 
to his harassment.98 The court held that the plaintiff’s use of “Wet 
Ones” was insufficient to constitute nonconformance to a male 
stereotype,99 but did not answer whether nonconformance to 
gender stereotypes, a theory outside the three situations 
enumerated in Oncale, was a viable theory of Title VII 
discrimination.100 
 
 94.  168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 95.  See James v. Platte River Steel Co., 113 F. App’x 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the plaintiff was not limited by the evidentiary routes as laid out in 
Oncale, but ultimately concluding that the plaintiff failed to show he was harassed 
“due to the fact that he failed to conform to gender stereotypes”); Bibby v. Phila. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying the plaintiff 
Title VII relief because he could not prove his discrimination occurred because of 
sex, but noting that “[b]ased on the facts of a particular case and the creativity of 
the parties, other ways in which to prove that harassment occurred because of sex 
may be available”). 
 96.  689 F.3d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 97.  Id. at 461. 
 98.  Id. at 462. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. (“Because there is insufficient evidence in this case to support the 
asserted sex stereotyping theory of same-sex harassment asserted by the EEOC, we 
need not decide whether such a theory is cognizable in this circuit.”).  
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However, the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and 
came to another decision on September 27, 2013.101 In the second 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit expressly ruled that a plaintiff can bring a 
same-sex sexual harassment claim for harassment on the basis of 
gender stereotyping.102 Furthermore, this time around, the Fifth 
Circuit decided to rule on the question of the exclusivity of the 
evidentiary routes from Oncale and held that the evidentiary routes 
are “illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.”103 
Other circuits have also accepted the sex-stereotype theory of 
same-sex discrimination. For example, in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant 
Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit allowed a male employee to bring a 
Title VII claim against his employer after he claimed male 
coworkers verbally harassed him for being too effeminate.104 
Without mentioning the three scenarios listed in Oncale, the court 
stated that verbal abuse based upon perceptions of gender 
nonconformity equate to discrimination because of sex, making 
such claims actionable under Title VII.105 
C. Ambiguous Readings of Oncale 
Some courts have addressed the growing circuit split but have 
declined to rule on the issue. For example, the Second Circuit, in 
Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., ruled that the aggressor treated 
women better than men under the third category of direct 
comparative evidence, concerning how members of both sexes are 
treated in a mixed-gender workplace.106 In a footnote to the case, 
the court stated that: 
We have not definitively resolved whether these three 
categories from Oncale were meant to establish an 
 
 101.  EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc).  
 102.  Id. at 454. The Court relied on the holding in Oncale as well as the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), 
holding that different-sex gender-stereotyping was an actionable claim under Title 
VII. The Fifth Circuit stated that “nothing in Oncale overturns or otherwise upsets 
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse,” and the ability to bring a claim based on 
gender stereotypes extends to same-sex harassment. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 
at 456. 
 103.  Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455. 
 104.  256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 105.  Id. at 874.  
 106.  512 F. App'x 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2013). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/12
 
2014] SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1625 
 
exclusive list or merely provide representative examples. 
Although we note that the Supreme Court explicitly used 
the phrase “for example” when discussing these potential 
“evidentiary route[s],” we need not resolve the issue 
because reversal is warranted under one of the three 
Oncale categories.107 
Furthermore, many courts do not apply their holdings in a 
consistent manner. On rehearing en banc in Boh Brothers 
Construction Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that “[e]very circuit to 
squarely consider the issue has held that the Oncale categories are 
illustrative, not exhaustive, in nature.”108 While it is true that many 
courts have expressly noted the nonexhaustive nature of the Oncale 
list, a growing trend has emerged in which courts acknowledge the 
list as nonexhaustive but then treat the list as exhaustive in 
practice.109 
Boh Brothers gives the example of Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2110 
as a case in which the Eighth Circuit expressly accepted the Oncale 
list as nonexhaustive.111 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit stated that “the 
Supreme Court set forth a non-exhaustive list that included three 
possible evidentiary routes same-sex harassment plaintiffs may 
follow to show that harassment was based on sex.”112 The ambiguity 
 
 107.  Id. at 117 n.3 (citation omitted).  
 108.  Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455. 
 109.  See, e.g., id. at 455 n.6.  
[W]e note that the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the availability of an 
evidentiary route not articulated in Oncale in 2006. See Vickers v. 
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–65 (6th Cir. 2006). In a 
subsequent case, the Sixth Circuit noted that Oncale offered “guidance” 
regarding the manner in which a plaintiff can prove same-sex 
harassment. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467–68 
(6th Cir. 2012). Although the court arguably treated the Oncale 
categories as if they were exclusive in Wasek, it did not expressly 
consider the issue because the plaintiff's claim fell into Oncale's first 
category. 
Id. 
 110.  397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 111.  Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 455 n.6. 
 112.  Pedroza, 397 F.3d at 1068 (emphasis added). The court additionally 
interpreted the first category more broadly than other courts, noting that the 
requirement is that the harasser acted out of sexual desire, not that the harasser 
was homosexual. Id. at 1069 n.2 (“We disagree with . . . the inferences that may 
flow from the facts that [the female harasser] had children and had been in a 
long-term relationship with a man. These facts tend to prove only that [the 
15
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arises because, despite that holding, the Eighth Circuit continued 
to use the Oncale list as a checklist for determining whether the 
conduct occurred “because of sex.”113 
The inconsistent application of the Oncale decision, in 
combination with the complicated nature of gender dynamics in 
the workplace, has caused a major gap to develop in same-sex 
sexual harassment, leaving legitimate victims of sexual harassment 
unable to bring Title VII claims. 
V. ARGUMENT 
In Oncale, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he critical issue, 
Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to 
which members of the other sex are not exposed.”114 Limiting same-
sex Title VII claims to the three situations enumerated in Oncale 
was not the intention of the Supreme Court.115 Furthermore, a rigid 
view of Title VII claims is incompatible with both the history of 
Title VII and society’s growing understanding of gender dynamics 
in the workplace.116 Courts should thus divorce their ties to 
inflexible theories of sexual harassment and should view both the 
“because of sex” requirement and the evidentiary routes from 
Oncale broadly. 
 
harasser] was not strictly homosexual. They do not preclude a jury from finding 
that [the harasser] was motivated by some degree of homosexual desire . . . .”).  
 113.  See, e.g., Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2010). The 
court in Smith held that there was no evidence that the aggressor was particularly 
attracted to the sexual harassment victim. Id. at 908. Similarly, the court rejected 
the last two evidentiary routes because it ruled that the aggressor treated both 
male and female employees “in the same vulgar and inappropriate way.” Id. The 
court thus concluded that the plaintiff had not proved discrimination on the basis 
of sex and upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id.; see also 
McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543–44 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(denying a same-sex sexual harassment claim because the inappropriate conduct 
did not fit into one of the Oncale categories). 
 114.  523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 115.  See infra Part V.A. 
 116.  See supra Part III. 
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A. Looking to the Oncale Decision for Direction 
It is not difficult to see why many courts have struggled with 
interpreting the Oncale decision. On one hand, the Supreme Court, 
through Justice Scalia’s opinion, provided clarity to lower courts as 
it opened the door for a broader view of sex discrimination claims 
by holding that individuals can bring same-sex sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII.117 On the other hand, as this article later 
notes, the opinion also left certain crucial interpretive questions 
unanswered.118 
The Oncale decision, however, provides some guidance on the 
proper interpretation of Title VII. Justice Scalia emphasized how 
the kind of discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes “sexual 
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.”119 
Thus, the true test of whether conduct qualifies as sexual 
discrimination is found in the statute itself. Rather than asking 
whether the conduct in question is analogous to any of the 
evidentiary routes listed in Oncale, courts should instead look to 
Title VII and ask whether conduct occurred because of the victim’s 
sex.120 The Seventh Circuit emphasized this point in Shepherd v. 
Slater Steels Corp.121 In Shepherd, the court stated, “The Court’s focus 
[in Oncale] was on what the plaintiff must ultimately prove rather 
 
 117.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.  
 118.  See infra Part V.B. 
 119.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The statute states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The relevant requirement listed 
in the statute is that the harassment occurred “because of such individual’s . . . 
sex.” Id. 
 120.  Confusion over the interpretation of Oncale, however, arises from the fact 
that the Court in Oncale provides little guidance on what Congress meant when it 
determined that discrimination must be “because of sex.” See infra Part V.B.  
 121.  168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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than the methods of doing so.”122 What the plaintiff must prove is 
whether the discrimination occurred because of sex. The examples 
listed in Oncale are simply methods of proving that conduct occurred 
because of sex.123 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia explicitly refers to the three 
evidentiary routes as examples.124 This particular choice of words 
signals the Court’s intention that the situations given were meant to 
be illustrative. If the Court had intended to give a rigid formula for 
determining whether conduct was sex discrimination, it could have 
made that intention clear by stating that there are only three 
methods of proving same-sex sexual harassment. 
Additionally, the Court stated how “[t]he real social impact of 
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of sur-
rounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are 
not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 
physical acts performed.”125 The Court here acknowledged how 
complicated sexual harassment cases can be. It therefore seems 
unlikely that the Court would then prescribe a fairly simple three-
part test for conclusively deciding whether conduct constitutes 
same-sex sexual harassment. 
B. What Constitutes Behavior “Because of Sex?” 
Part of the reason courts have taken such varied approaches 
after Oncale is that Oncale did little to clarify what kind of conduct 
actually is actionable under Title VII. Justice Scalia confirmed 
that “[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, 
 
 122.  Id. at 1009. 
 123.  To emphasize this point, the Shepherd court noted that discrimination 
should not be determined by a rigid formula. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin 
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–13 (1996); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). 
 124.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by 
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier 
of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is 
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it 
clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women 
in the workplace.” (emphasis added)); see also Barrows v. Seneca Foods Corp., 
512 F. App'x 115, 117 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to comment on whether the 
evidentiary routes in Oncale are exhaustive, but taking note of the Court’s explicit 
use of the phrase “for example”).  
 125.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82. 
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he or she must always prove that the conduct . . . constituted 
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’”126 Yet, neither Title VII nor 
Oncale defines “sex.”127 
According to Merriam-Webster, “sex” is first defined as “either 
of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species 
and that are distinguished respectively as female or male 
esp[ecially] on the basis of their reproductive organs and 
structures.”128 Under this definition, the “because of sex” 
requirement is satisfied when a person is discriminated against 
because he or she is biologically male or female.129 
Merriam-Webster also defines “sex” as “sexually motivated 
phenomena or behavior” or “genitalia.”130 Under these definitions, 
“because of sex” would encompass all behavior motivated by sexual 
desire.131 
Current dictionaries typically do not, however, define “sex” as 
including cultural, psychological, or behavioral traits, as these are 
now known as constituting “gender” rather than sex.132 However, in 
1961, three years before Title VII was passed, Merriam-Webster 
included “[t]he sphere of behavior dominated by the relations 
between male and female” as an additional definition of “sex.”133 
 
 126.  Id. at 81.  
 127.  With no definition and with little legislative history surrounding Title VII, 
“the jurisprudence defining the parameters of a cause of action under Title VII 
has evolved with little legislative guidance on the question of when the challenged 
conduct occurs ‘because of’ a person's ‘sex.’” Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, 
Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual 
Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before 
and After Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 162 (1999). 
 128.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1140 (11th ed. 2003).  
 129.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Theories of Harassment “Because of Sex,” in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 41, at 155, 157. 
 130.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128, at 1140. 
 131.  Eskridge, Jr., supra note 129, at 157.  
 132.  Compare MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128, 
at 520 (“Gender”), and THE NEW AMERICAN OXFORD DICTIONARY 700 (2nd ed. 
2005) (same), with MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 128 
(“Sex”), and THE NEW AMERICAN OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra, at 1553 (same). See 
generally FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE (3d. ed. 2004) (“Since the 1960s this 
secondary sense [of sex] has come into much more frequent use, especially among 
feminists, with the intention ‘of emphasizing the social and cultural, as opposed to 
the biological, distinctions between the sexes.’”). 
 133.  Eskridge, J.R., supra note 129.  
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Indeed, courts have regularly recognized gender-based discrimi-
nation as actionable under Title VII.134 
C. Sexual Desire Often Is Not the True Motive Behind Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment 
If the three evidentiary routes enumerated in Oncale are 
thought of as exhaustive, cases may arise, such as Wasek, in which 
the only way to prove sexual harassment is through proof of the 
aggressor’s sexual desire or homosexuality.135 Viewing sexual 
harassment only in terms of sexual desire, however, vastly simplifies 
the power and gender dynamics that often exist behind the acts of 
sexual harassment. In fact, Justice Scalia said as much in the Oncale 
opinion.136 
Some of the most common forms of opposite-sex sexual 
harassment are not motivated by sexual desire, but rather are forms 
of gender-based harassment “designed to maintain work . . . as 
bastions of masculine competence and authority.”137 The EEOC 
 
 134.  See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 164–65 (“[T]he courts, implicitly 
recognizing that a person's gender is integrally related [to] that person's sex as it is 
perceived by others, have characterized such gender-based conduct as sex-based 
conduct within the purview of Title VII.”); see also, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that discrimination based on the plaintiff’s 
lack of femininity was actionable).  
 135.  See Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“Wasek’s evidence can only fit into the first of these three routes. No evidence 
exists that Ottobre was motivated by a general hostility towards men. And the oil 
rig was not a mixed-sex workplace, so there is no possibility of comparative 
evidence. Thus, in order to infer discrimination, Wasek must demonstrate that 
Ottobre was homosexual.”). 
 136.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) 
(“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an 
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.”).  
 137.  Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 
(1998). According to Schultz, 
The forms of such harassment are wide-ranging. They include 
characterizing the work as appropriate for men only; denigrating 
women’s performance or ability to master the job; providing 
patronizing forms of help in performing the job; withholding the 
training, information, or opportunity to learn to do the job well; 
engaging in deliberate work sabotage; providing sexist evaluations of 
women’s performance or denying them deserved promotions; isolating 
women from the social networks that confer a sense of belonging; 
denying women the perks or privileges that are required for success; 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/12
 
2014] SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1631 
 
compliance manuals and guidelines confirm that “sex-based 
harassment—that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or 
language—may also give rise to Title VII liability (just as in the case 
of harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is 
‘sufficiently patterned or pervasive’ and directed at employees 
because of their sex.”138 
The Supreme Court expressed this understanding for 
opposite-sex sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., a 
case in which the plaintiff, Teresa Harris, was verbally insulted 
because of her gender and targeted through sexual innuendo 
jokes.139 The president of Forklift Systems often made derogatory 
comments toward Harris, including, “You’re a woman, what do you 
know” and “We need a man as the rental manager.”140 
Harris presented a different spin on the traditional view of 
sexual harassment as “economically leveraged sexual coercion.”141 
This case was not about sexual desire. In fact, it was about the 
opposite of sexual desire.142 In these kinds of cases, men are not 
 
assigning women sex-stereotyped service tasks that lie outside their job 
descriptions (such as cleaning or serving coffee); engaging in taunting, 
pranks, and other forms of hazing designed to remind women that 
they are different and out of place; and physically assaulting or 
threatening to assault the women who dare to fight back. Of course, 
making a woman the object of sexual attention can also work to 
undermine her image and self-confidence as a capable worker. Yet, 
much of the time, harassment assumes a form that has little or nothing 
to do with sexuality but everything to do with gender.  
Id. 
 138.  Id. at 1732 n.246 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.6, ¶ 3105, 
at 3217 (Jan. 1982); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at E-1 (Mar. 28, 1990)).  
 139.  510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Siegel, supra note 41, at 22; see also McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“We have never held that sexual harassment . . . must, to be 
illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents with 
clearly sexual overtones. . . . Rather, we hold that any harassment or other unequal 
treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the 
sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, 
comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 142.  See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in 
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1721 (2002) (stating that in Harris, 
“the harassers’ motivation was to humiliate a woman co-worker” and there was no 
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using their power to coerce women sexually; rather, they are using 
“sexualized and nonsexualized conduct to communicate to women 
their outsider status in the workplace.”143 
For example, courts have held that certain gender-based and 
sexist epithets constitute sex-based discrimination under Title 
VII.144 Additionally, physical aggression, violence, and verbal abuse 
without sexual overtones may constitute harassment based on 
sex.145 
Some scholars believe that this communication of outsider 
status translates equally to same-sex sexual harassment. For 
example, Reva B. Siegel expressed the following interpretation of 
Oncale: 
Suppose the men harassing Oncale are straight. The male-
male harassment in Oncale could well be assimilated to the 
male-female harassment in Harris. On this view, Oncale’s 
harassers would be deploying sexualized conduct to 
gender-mark work roles, even though no women are on 
the scene—in some important sense to ensure that no 
women ever appear on the scene.146 
The more society learns about the hierarchical structure of the 
workplace, the more society has realized that sexual harassment, or 
sexual abuse in general, is not about sex but instead about power.147 
 
evidence that the harasser acted out of sexual desire for the plaintiff).  
 143.  Siegel, supra note 41, at 22.  
 144.  See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the words “curb side cunt” “bitch” and “floor whore” were 
sufficient to constitute Title VII harassment); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 
842 F.2d 1010, 1012, 1014–15 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the words “fucking flag 
girls,” “cavern cunt,” and “blond bitch,” in combination with other forms of 
harassment, was severe and pervasive enough to constitute Title VII sex 
discrimination); Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, No. 4:95CV1533 JCH, 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20828, at *5–6, *18 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 1996) (plaintiff called “fucking 
bitch,” “fucking cunt,” and “fucking whore”).  
 145.  See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 188 (citing Quick v. Donaldson 
Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a district court was incorrect 
for concluding that harassment could not be gender-based if motivated by enmity 
or hooliganism)).  
 146.  Siegel, supra note 41, at 25.  
 147.  Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 471814 (citing MICHAEL 
SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 35 (1997)) 
(drawing attention to a collection of studies that show how the hierarchies of all-
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In an amicus brief for the Oncale case, Catherine MacKinnon 
noted that “[m]en are most often raped by other men when there 
are no women around: in prisons, in confined and isolated work 
sites, in men’s schools and colleges, in the military, in athletics, in 
fraternities.”148 These men are still victimized because of their sex, 
because they are being made to feel inferior as men.149 As 
MacKinnon makes clear, this diminishment of masculinity “cannot 
be done to a woman. What he loses, he loses through gender, as a 
man.”150 
For MacKinnon and other legal scholars who follow this line of 
reasoning, the sexual act itself is enough to constitute sex-based 
discrimination.151 The logic behind this argument is that the act of 
sexual harassment is an act which asserts male dominance; it thus 
does not matter whether the actor was male or female—all that 
matters is that the act asserted sexual dominance.152 This argument 
looks to the effect of the rape or sexual harassment, not the motive.153 
One can look to the Wasek case as an example of a situation 
where sexual acts were used to enforce power dynamics. In that 
case, the aggressor, Ottobre, used sexualized language and actions 
toward Wasek.154 The abuse escalated after Wasek struggled with 
heavy equipment.155 Furthermore, Ottobre was enabled to continue 
the abuse through the encouragement of other men in Arrow 
Energy’s male-dominated workplace, including Wasek’s supervisor, 
 
male environments often lead to sexual abuse, motivated by competition, violence 
as a rite of passage, and more). 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 10. 
 151.  Id. at 4 (“Other legal requisites being met, if acts are sexual and hurt one 
sex, they are sex-based, regardless of the gender and sexual orientation of the 
parties.”).  
 152.  Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 600 (2013). 
 153.  Id. (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND 
RAPE 15, 105 (1975)) (“Whatever the motive, the effect of rape is to maintain male 
supremacy, just as lynching maintained white supremacy. Sexual harassment is not 
stripped of its meaning as an act of male supremacy when the harassers are of the 
same sex, just as lynching would not escape its historical connotation as a 
technology of racial supremacy if it were done by and to people of the same 
race.”). 
 154.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 155.  Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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Pat Tripp, who laughed at Wasek instead of intervening.156 In fact, 
Tripp told Wasek he would be punished if he reported the abuse to 
the director of operations.157 Instead of attempting to put an end to 
the abuse, Tripp told Wasek to stop whining.158 Additionally, Wasek 
was encouraged to solve the problem by using physical violence 
against Ottobre.159 
One could argue that what happened in Wasek was a systematic 
imposition of power against someone who was viewed as weaker 
than the other men on the job. Because Wasek was a man, he was 
expected to take the abuse and to stop whining. Because he was a 
man, he was encouraged to fight back with violence if he had a 
problem with the abuse. One could thus argue that even though 
sexual desire did not motivate Wasek’s harassment, Wasek was still 
harassed because of his sex. 
D. Difficulties with Proving the Aggressor’s Sexual Desire or Orientation 
Unlike same-sex sexual harassment, when a harasser and his or 
her victim are of opposite sexes, 
there is a reasonable inference that the harasser is acting 
because of the victim’s sex. . . . Thus, when a heterosexual 
man makes implicit or explicit proposals of sexual activity 
to a woman coworker or subordinate, it is easy to 
conclude or at least infer that the behavior is motivated by 
her sex.160 
This inference is not necessarily presumed in cases of same-sex sexual 
harassment, however.161 It is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, 
 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. When Wasek did report the abuse to the director of operations, the 
Michigan director of operations responded by asking Wasek, “Why don't you just 
kick [Ottobre's] ass?” Id. at 466.  
 158.  Id. at 465. The Pennsylvania director of operations also “chastise[d] 
Wasek for ‘whining.’” Id. at 466.  
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citation omitted) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
80 (1998)); see also Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 164 (“[I]n the opposite-sex 
context, courts have readily inferred the requisite sex-based causal nexus from the 
nature of the harassment itself when the harassment invokes gender-based 
stereotypes or entails sexualized interactions that reinforce and perpetuate gender 
hierarchies.”).  
 161.  Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262.  
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to determine what precisely motivates sexual harassment.162 Yet, as 
Wasek has made clear, in situations where the workplace is not 
mixed-gender, whether or not a Title VII claim survives can depend 
solely on the aggressor’s sexual desire.163 
Many courts have used a harasser’s sexual orientation to prove 
that he or she acted out of sexual desire.164 In fact, as Wasek 
displayed, plaintiffs are sometimes “precluded from recovery unless 
they are able to prove to some extent the homosexuality of their 
harasser.”165 The tendency to equate sexual desire with sexual 
orientation may stem directly from Scalia’s opinion in Oncale. Scalia 
states that sexual desire could be inferred “if there were credible 
 
 162.  For example, Professor of Law Katherine M. Franke is critical of a 
Title VII analysis that requires proof that “but for” the victim’s gender, the 
offender would not have engaged in the harassment. She states:  
[O]ne of the great strengths of Title VII generally, and sexual 
harassment jurisprudence specifically, is that it applies to conduct that 
has either the purpose or the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex. 
Over time, Title VII has proven to be an effective weapon in combating 
social attitudes about the relative interests and abilities of men and 
women that are not necessarily grounded in animus so much as 
outmoded myths and stereotypes. Thus a male boss who interjects 
sexual comments and behavior into his working relationship with a 
female colleague may be guilty of sexual harassment whether he 
naively meant to flatter or invidiously hoped to “get off” on her 
presence in the workplace. 
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 41, at 169, 173. 
 163.  Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468; see also Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 
F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 164.  See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; Wasek, 682 F.3d at 468; Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, 
Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 162 (2012); Love v. 
Motiva Enters., 349 F. App’x 900, 903 (5th Cir. 2009); La Day v. Catalyst Tech., 
Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th Cir. 2002). Katherine M. Franke notes the problem 
with the view that a harasser would not have engaged in the harassment “but for” 
the sex of the victim. She states, 
[I]n these cases “but for” causation collapses into sexual orientation. 
Under this view, a harasser only sexually harasses members of the class 
of people that he or she sexually desires. As such, “because of sex,” 
primarily means “because of the harasser’s sexual orientation,” and 
only secondarily means “because of the victim’s sex.” 
Franke, supra note 162, at 173–74. 
 165.  Mary Ann Connell & Donna Euben, Evolving Law in Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 31 J.C. & U.L. 193, 202 (2004). 
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evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”166 However, a 
primarily heterosexual male aggressor may find himself attracted to 
a male employee for the first time and act according to that sexual 
desire. In this case, there would be no evidence of the aggressor’s 
homosexuality besides the act committed against his coworker.167 
Therefore, using a person’s sexual orientation may not be an 
accurate indicator of whether an aggressor acted according to 
sexual desire.168 
The Eighth Circuit noted this potential problem in Pedroza v. 
Cintas Corp. No. 2.169 In Pedroza, a female employee, Terri Pedroza, 
was subject to harassment from one of her female coworkers, Pam 
Straw.170 The workplace seemed to be exclusively female, and 
 
 166.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 167.  Arguably, it may be more difficult to prove the sexual orientation of an 
individual who identifies as LGBT than a person who does not identify as LGBT. 
This is because, historically, LGBT individuals have been encouraged to hide their 
sexual preferences due to lack of acceptance in the workplace. See BOB POWERS & 
ALAN ELLIS, A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE WORKPLACE 5 
(1995). 
   When negative messages or signals are sent, many employees feel 
forced to hide their sexual identity. . . . 
. . . . 
   Whenever a manager or coworker tells a homophobic, racist, or 
sexist joke, the message is sent that it is not okay to be yourself. Every 
time we exclude sexual minorities, we reinforce the message that 
sexual minorities are not welcome. Often this is done inadvertently—
for example, in training classes where role plays contain references 
only to opposite sex couples or in invitations to office parties in which 
husbands and wives are encouraged to attend but no attempt is made 
to include same-sex partners. Although seemingly subtle, these acts 
reinforce the message that one needs to hide simply to survive. 
Id. Therefore, an individual who must prove his or her aggressor’s homosexual 
orientation may face evidentiary obstacles that are not faced in different-sex sexual 
harassment, because sexual minorities have often been encouraged by their 
coworkers and society at large to hide their sexual preferences.  
 168.  See Franke, supra note 162, at 174 (“[A]s a logical matter, this reasoning 
works only in a world populated exclusively by Kinsey Ones and Kinsey Sixes, that 
is, people who are exclusively heterosexual or exclusively homosexual in their 
attractions, desires, and sexual behavior.”).  
 169.  397 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 170.  Id. at 1066. Straw allegedly attempted to grab Pedroza’s hand, asked 
Pedroza, “You want me to kiss you, honey?” and then attempted to kiss Pedroza on 
the mouth. Id. Straw told Pedroza she did not have a husband and that “I want 
you, honey.” Id. She also rubbed her buttocks several times in an attempt to get 
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Pedroza did not argue that Straw was generally hostile toward other 
women in the workplace.171 Thus, the court concluded that the only 
remaining question was whether Straw’s behavior was motivated by 
sexual desire.172 The court noted that Straw had five children from 
a former marriage and that she lived with a long-term boyfriend.173 
However, the court also stated that evidence of Straw’s children 
and her boyfriend only tended to show “that Straw was not strictly 
homosexual”174 and the evidence does “not preclude a jury from 
finding that Straw was motivated by some degree of homosexual 
desire towards Pedroza.”175 
Another unfortunate result of improperly emphasizing sexual 
orientation is that it makes it much easier to bring a Title VII claim 
against a homosexual coworker.176 For example, a situation in 
which an openly gay employee grabs a coworker’s genitals is much 
more likely to result in a successful Title VII claim than a situation 
in which a non-openly gay or straight employee grabs a coworker’s 
genitals. Both situations concern the same kind of conduct, and a 
victim would likely respond the same way to either situation; 
however, the claim against the homosexual coworker has a greater 
chance of surviving a court’s scrutiny. 
E. Examples of Clear Sex Discrimination Where Adherence to a Rigid 
Evidentiary Formula Causes the Claim to Fail. 
One of the main problems with interpreting the Oncale list as 
exhaustive is that the three categories do not cover every instance 
that sexual harassment occurred because of the victim’s sex. 
The most common example that courts are beginning to 
recognize is where an individual is harassed by his or her coworkers 
 
Pedroza’s attention. Id.  
 171.  Id. at 1068–69. 
 172.  Id. at 1069.  
 173.  Id.  
 174.  Id. at 1069 at n.2. 
 175.  Id. But see Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 
2012) (holding that Wasek’s suspicion that his aggressor was “a little strange, 
possibly bisexual” was insufficient to establish the first Oncale category of 
harassment motivated by sexual desire).  
 176.  Connell & Euben, supra note 165, at 208 (“[G]ay harassers became target 
defendants of Title VII, whereas non-gay men can harass gender nonconforming 
men with impunity.”) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 142, at 1763). 
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for failing to conform to stereotypical gender roles.177 This was the 
situation in EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co.178 An increasing 
number of courts are beginning to recognize that this kind of 
harassment is actionable under Title VII due to the fact that the 
harassment occurs because of the victim’s sex.179 One could argue 
 
 177.  In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, who worked at Price 
Waterhouse’s Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C., was proposed 
for partnership. Id. at 233. However, some of the partners had doubts about her 
performance because she was a woman. Id. at 235. She was described by certain 
partners as being too “macho” and that she was “overcompensate[ing] for being a 
woman.” Id. Additionally, her use of profanity was criticized “because it's a lady 
using foul language.” Id. Hopkins was told that she should “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.” Id. Hopkins was neither denied nor offered a partnership; 
however, she was held for reconsideration the following year. Id. at 233. When the 
partners refused to reconsider her the following year, Hopkins brought a Title VII 
claim. Id. at 231–32. The Supreme Court ruled that if an employer acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman either should or should not be aggressive, then the 
employer has acted on the basis of gender. Id. at 250. The Court stated, “[W]e are 
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group . . . .” Id. 
at 251. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. was an early case that confirmed 
that the rule from Price Waterhouse also applied to man-on-man gender-
stereotyping. 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999).  
Oncale confirms that the standards of liability under Title VII, as they 
have been refined and explicated over time, apply to same-sex 
plaintiffs just as they do to opposite-sex plaintiffs. In other words, just 
as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated 
against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of 
femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men 
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of masculinity.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
 178.  731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013); see supra Part IV.B.  
 179.  See Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 454 (“[N]umerous courts, including 
ours, have recognized that a plaintiff can satisfy Title VII’s because-of-sex 
requirement with evidence of a plaintiff’s perceived failure to conform to 
traditional gender stereotypes.”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“[D]iscrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-
nonconformity is sex discrimination.”); Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 
591 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a reasonable fact finder could 
find that the plaintiff faced discrimination on the basis of sex when she failed to 
meet employment requirements that she be “pretty” and have the “Midwestern girl 
look”); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding 
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that Wasek fell into this category based on the harassment Wasek 
faced for not asserting himself as a dominant male.180 
Another example that is not necessarily covered in the 
evidentiary routes laid out in Oncale is harassment based on a 
coworker’s appearance. For example, Schmitz v. ING Securities, 
Futures & Options, Inc.181 presented the opposite of what is 
considered a typical sexual harassment case. Instead of a supervisor 
harassing an employee because of sexual desire, the male 
supervisor in this case harassed Schmitz based on a “criticism of 
Schmitz for what he viewed as her flaunting of inappropriately sexy 
dress and sexy demeanor.”182 The supervisor never offered sexual 
propositions, never asked Schmitz for a date, and never indicated 
any kind of sexual interest in her.183 Instead, Schmitz’s supervisor 
complained that her attire undermined office productivity because 
“‘any hot-blooded male’ in the office could be aroused.”184 He also 
told her that “he would never let his wife leave the house dressed as 
 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that sex-based discrimination occurred 
when a female employer denied a female employee a promotion based on a belief 
that the employee would prioritize being a caregiver to her four young children 
over her job); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that verbal abuse based on the perception that a male employee was 
effeminate could constitute discrimination “because of sex”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff may be able 
to prove that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting 
evidence that the harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did 
not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender.”).  
 180.  See supra Part V.B. Wasek worked on an all-male oil rig. As the National 
Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. argues in its amicus brief for the 
Oncale case, “all-male environments are frequently characterized by extreme 
hierarchy well-documented to breed sexual abuse of men by men.” Brief for 
National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., supra note 147, 
at 9. Males thus often harass other males who are viewed as less powerful. One 
could argue that in this case, Ottobre harassed Wasek because he viewed him as 
weak, and because he viewed him as “less” of a man. The author argues that this 
amounts to harassment based on Ottobre’s belief that Wasek did not conform to a 
stereotypically aggressive and dominant male gender role.  
 181.  10 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d, No. 98-3007, 1999 WL 528024 
(7th Cir. July 20, 1999).  
 182.  Id. at 986.  
 183.  Schmitz v. ING Sec., Futures & Options, Inc., No. 98-3007, 1999 
WL 528024, at *1 (7th Cir. July 20, 1999). 
 184.  Id.  
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Schmitz was.”185 Although the Seventh Circuit denied Schmitz’s 
sexual harassment claim,186 the Supreme Court allowed a similar 
case to succeed in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.187 In Harris, the 
harasser made comments encouraging women employees to dress 
to expose their breasts and made other sexual innuendos about the 
way the plaintiff dressed.188 Although these cases involved male 
criticism of a female coworker, it is easy to imagine a situation in 
which a woman harasses another woman based on the second 
woman’s appearance or clothing choices.189 Like the assertions of 
male dominance common in all-male workplaces, female-on-female 
harassment may occur because of a perceived threat of power.190 
 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id. at *3. The court ruled that the conduct in this case was not severe 
enough to amount to harassment. However, this case proves that even different-
sex sexual harassment claims can improperly rely on sexual desire. The court 
stated that “Schmitz fails to satisfy the first prong because she cannot show that she 
was subjected to sexual advances or requests for sexual favors.” Id. However, there 
are certainly other methods of proving sexual harassment other than sexual 
desire. See Franke, supra note 162, at 175–76 (“Tragically, the Court’s reasoning [in 
Oncale] has reinforced the lower courts’ inclination to make sex matter too much 
and for the wrong reasons.”). 
 187.  510 U.S. 17 (1993). Arguably, the conduct in Harris was more severe than 
the conduct in Schmitz; yet the plaintiff in the Harris case was also subjected to 
sexual innuendos based on her dress. Id. at 19.  
 188.  Brief for Petitioner at 5, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) 
(No. 92-1168), 1993 WL 302216.  
 189.  Dr. Peggy Drexler argues that female comments on appearance and 
dress have become routine in some workplaces, despite the fact that this behavior 
“would be seen more obviously as harassment when coming from a man.” Peggy 
Drexler, The Tyranny of the Queen Bee, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2013, at C1, available at 
LEXIS. 
 190.  See id. (“Some women—especially in industries that remain male-
dominated—assume that their perches may be pulled from beneath them at any 
given moment . . . . Made to second-guess themselves, they try to ensure their own 
dominance by keeping others, especially women, down.”). The Workplace 
Bullying Institute, an organization based out of the state of Washington, 
conducted a survey in 2010 on workplace bullying. The results of the 2010 survey 
show that although bullying is done primarily by men, eighty percent of female 
bullies target other women in the office. That number marks an increase of nine 
percent from when the study was last conducted in 2007. In general, the results of 
the study show that in thirty-four percent of workplace bullying incidents, the bully 
is male and the target is male. In thirty-percent of those incidents, the bully is 
female and the target is female. Thus, female-on-female bullying is a growing issue 
in the workplace. Gender & Workplace Bullying: 2010 WBI Survey, WORKPLACE 
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However, harassment based on appearance will not always fit into 
one of the three Oncale categories.191 
Furthermore, the Oncale categories do not necessarily include 
situations in which there is sexual action, but no motive of sexual 
desire; yet this kind of harassment is regularly regarded as sexual 
harassment when perpetrated by a member of the opposite sex.192 
For example, in Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit held that “[r]ape is unquestionably among the most severe 
forms of sexual harassment. . . . Being raped is, at minimum, an act 
of discrimination based on sex.”193 The Oncale categories look to the 
motive behind the sexual harassment rather than the harassment 
itself, meaning an instance of sexual assault that was not motivated 
 
BULLYING INST. (2010), http://www.workplacebullying.org/multi/pdf/gender 
_2010_wbi.pdf. Although Justice Scalia made clear in Oncale that general 
workplace bullying does not constitute sexual harassment for purposes of a Title 
VII claim, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), often bullying and sexual harassment overlap. 
What is perceived as bullying may actually be sexual harassment. See Axam & 
Zalesne, supra note 127; infra Part V.F. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
some of those reported instances of workplace bullying actually constituted male-
on-male or female-on-female sexual harassment. Same-sex sexual harassment thus 
may be more common than people realize. 
 191.  The facts of each case must determine the proper analysis, but the 
author argues that this situation will not always fit into either of the categories. 
This kind of harassment does not necessary reflect a general hostility toward 
women in the workplace. This theory appears even less likely if one accepts Dr. 
Peggy Drexler’s theory that women sometimes bully other women out of a sense of 
competition. See Drexler, supra note 189. If a woman harasses another woman 
based on a belief that she is more qualified for a position or promotion or other 
workplace benefit, she obviously believes that women are qualified for that 
workplace benefit. Finally, as with other cases examined in this note, the third 
category often hinges on whether comparative evidence is available. In a female-
dominated workplace, comparative evidence may be difficult, if not impossible, to 
obtain. 
 192.  For example, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2002), the court ruled that physical sexual assault automatically constituted 
harassment under Title VII. See also 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 5:42 n.20 (2013) (“The most extreme form of offensive physical, 
sexual conduct—rape—clearly violates Title VII.”).  
 193.  265 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended and superseded on denial 
of reh’g, 301 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 
1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Just as every murder is also a battery, every rape committed 
in the employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee's sex.”). 
31
Vohs: I Don't Know the Question, But Sex Is Definitely the Answer: The
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
1642 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:4 
 
by any of the three enumerated evidentiary routes would not be 
actionable under Title VII.194 
While it may be true that not every instance of vulgarity in a 
workplace amounts to actionable sexual harassment, the complex 
gender dynamics and power structures in a typical office allow 
discrimination on the basis of sex to manifest itself in several 
different ways. This is precisely why the three evidentiary routes in 
Oncale cannot be interpreted as exhaustive, and this is why Oncale 
emphasized that a court should consider “all the circumstances” 
surrounding a same-sex Title VII claim.195 
F. Recommendations 
In EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co.,196 Judge Grady Jolly, in his 
dissenting opinion, expressed his concern over proving more 
abstract theories of sexual harassment.197 This concern may be 
legitimate, because, for example, proving that an aggressor was 
sexually interested in a harassed employee may be easier than 
proving that he or she acted to maintain power hierarchies in the 
workplace.198 This is especially true because an aggressor might not 
 
 194.  See, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 
2012) (denying the plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment despite the fact that he 
was prodded in the rear by a hammer and a long sucker rod); Smith v. Hy-Vee, 
Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying the plaintiff’s claim despite the 
fact that the plaintiff was repeatedly groped by the aggressor). 
 195.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 196.  731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 197.  See id. at 471 (Jolly, J., dissenting) 
   But regardless of whether there are other methods for making this 
determination, the EEOC proffered no basis for inferring 
discriminatory intent based upon Woods's sex—subjective or objective. 
Rather, it moves quickly from asserting that other evidentiary paths are 
available to a conclusion that, because Wolfe targeted certain words 
and acts at Woods, Wolfe's mal intent to sexually discriminate against 
Woods was proved. This line of reasoning completely abdicates the 
burden prescribed to plaintiffs in same-sex sexual discrimination cases 
by the Supreme Court in Oncale—which is not simply to assert the basis 
for the inference of harassment based upon sex, but to further prove 
the truth of that assertion. 
Id.  
 198.  See Clarke, supra note 152, at 536 (“Although the Supreme Court held 
that ‘harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an 
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex,’ in practice, it has been difficult for 
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consciously recognize that he or she is attempting to maintain 
gender dynamics. 
However, there are methods for proving these more abstract 
theories of sexual harassment. For example, an attorney could have 
used the negative reactions of Wasek’s supervisors199 and the 
increased harassment that Wasek experienced after he struggled 
with some heavy equipment200 to argue that Wasek was harassed for 
not conforming to a dominant and aggressive male stereotype. 
Courts need to have an open mind when accepting this evidence, 
but attorneys and organizations like the EEOC also need to think 
outside of the Oncale box. Additionally, human resource repre-
sentatives and sexual harassment investigators need to be aware of 
these potential theories of sexual harassment so that they can 
gather the right evidence and conduct witness interviews effectively. 
Another ever-present concern in sexual harassment law is that 
broadening the definition of “because of sex” will lead to a flood of 
frivolous Title VII cases.201 After all, at the time of the Oncale 
decision, sexual harassment was the fastest growing area of 
employment discrimination.202 It is worth noting, however, that the 
number of sexual harassment claims filed has actually decreased in 
recent years.203 
Additionally, limiting the number of sexual harassment claims 
by narrowly defining “because of sex” excludes many instances of 
legitimate sexual harassment.204 As noted above, “because of sex” 
 
plaintiffs to establish causation based on any other theory.” (citations omitted)).  
 199.  See Wasek, 682 F.3d at 467. 
 200.  Id. at 465.  
 201.  For example, in Oncale, Justice Scalia noted that Title VII is not “a 
general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 202.  Schultz, supra note 137, at 1686 n.6 (citing Kirstin Downey Grimsley, 
Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily; New Laws Boost Hopes for Monetary Awards, WASH. 
POST, May 12, 1997, at A1, available at 1997 WLNR 7183487) (noting the increase 
in sexual harassment complaints from 6127 complaints in 1990 to 15,342 
complaints in 1996). 
 203.  The number of sexual harassment claims filed with the EEOC and state 
and local Fair Employment Practices agencies in the United States declined from 
15,889 in fiscal year 1997 to 11,364 in fiscal year 2011. Sexual Harassment 
Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual 
_harassment.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2014).  
 204.  See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 176 (“Accordingly, it is apparent 
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could mean conduct motivated by sexual desire,205 animosity toward 
a person’s biological sex,206 animosity toward a person’s gender,207 
or simply conduct that is inherently sexual.208 This broad meaning 
cannot be encompassed by the three Oncale evidentiary routes. 
Rather than limiting the abstract category of “because of sex” 
through an exhaustive interpretation of the Oncale list of 
evidentiary routes, courts should place limitations on cases based 
on the requirements that harassment be severe, pervasive, and 
unwelcome, and that there exists some basis for imputing liability 
to an employer.209 In Oncale, for example, Justice Scalia notes how 
courts need to draw distinctions between discriminatory employ-
ment conditions and “ordinary socializing in the workplace.”210 It is 
worth noting, however, that although courts should place limits on 
conduct that is not sufficiently severe, a narrow view of the severe 
and pervasive requirement may also have dangerous results.  
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on horseplay in the Oncale context 
seems questionable given the egregious behavior that took place in 
that case. This is due to the fact that Oncale did not involve “mild 
insults, distasteful jokes, or sporadic incidents of questionable 
offensiveness,” but instead involved a “relentless pattern of explicit 
threats of rape, culminating in physical assaults in which multiple 
harassers restrained Oncale, forced him into contact with another 
man’s penis, and subjected him to forcible anal penetration with a 
foreign object amidst threats of anal rape.” The danger of Scalia’s 
statement in this context is that it has caused courts to 
mischaracterize legitimate same-sex sexual harassment as “mere 
horseplay.”211 In Wasek, where the plaintiff was subjected to sexually 
 
that the cases analyzing sexual harassment directed at women have not adhered to 
a rigid, simplistic conception of ‘sex’ in assessing whether the conduct could be 
characterized as conduct that occurred ‘because of’ the plaintiff's ‘sex’ within the 
meaning of Title VII.”).  
 205.  See supra Part V.B.  
 206.  See supra Part V.B. 
 207.  See supra Part V.B. 
 208.  See supra Part V.C. 
 209.  Bates, supra note 25, at 146–47. 
 210.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 211.  See Axam & Zalesne, supra note 127, at 224 (“Numerous other same-sex 
sexual harassment cases have involved closely analogous examples of physical 
sexual assault and forcible simulations of oral or anal sodomy that were 
perpetrated by one or more harassers as part of a pattern of incessant verbal and 
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assaultive conduct similar to the conduct in Oncale,212 the court 
noted how “the conduct of jerks, bullies, and persecutors is simply 
not actionable under Title VII unless they are acting because of the 
victim’s gender.”213 
Thus, while the requirements for sexual harassment should be 
used to limit frivolous cases, viewing any category too narrowly 
could exclude legitimate sex-based discrimination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The complicated nature of gender discrimination and the 
relatively short history of sexual harassment claims have led to 
judicial inconsistency. Courts have been especially inconsistent with 
same-sex sexual harassment claims because on one hand, they have 
felt increasing pressure from society to expand the definition of 
sexual harassment,214 and on the other hand, they have felt the 
need to narrow the definition to keep certain “trivial” claims out of 
the court system.215 However, when judges confine themselves to 
narrow definitions of sexual harassment, certain individuals are 
unjustly precluded from bringing Title VII claims. Yet gender 
discrimination is too complicated for such narrow definitions. If 
society truly wants to eradicate workplace discrimination, our 
justice system needs to adequately address the complexities of the 
power hierarchies of the office environment. 
 
 
physical abuse that would not be not easily confused with ‘ordinary socializing’ or 
‘horseplay.’”).  
 212.  In Wasek, the plaintiff was poked in the rear with a hammer and a long 
sucker rod. Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 213.  Id. at 467. 
 214.  For example, at the time this article was written, Congress was debating 
passage of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which would 
prohibit employment discrimination “based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.” Support for increasing who is covered under sexual harassment claims 
can be inferred from the advocates for these new protections. See Sylvia Ann 
Hewlett, ENDA Vote Is Just the Beginning, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2013 4:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sylvia-ann-hewlett/enda-vote-is-just-the-beginning 
_b_3613199.html.  
 215.  See supra Part V.F. 
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